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ABSTRACT
This study examines the effects of financial statement disclosure regulation on auditor
market concentration and audit fees.  I compare auditor industry concentration rates between
municipalities reporting under the Single Audit Act in the state of Michigan, which requires all
local governments to follow GAAP reporting, with concentration rates in Pennsylvania, which
has unregulated reporting.  Using both an interstate comparison as well as examining a policy
change in the unregulated environment, I find evidence suggesting that auditor concentration is
related to disclosure mandates.  Through survey data, I then explore the impact of reporting
regulation on audit fees.  My findings suggest GAAP mandated disclosure is associated with an
overall lower audit fee, evidence suggestive of economies of scale; however, specialist firms in
the GAAP setting are able to differentiate themselves and earn a fee premium.  The state with
unregulated disclosure does not benefit from the same audit economies having a market
containing higher overall audit fees as well as specialist auditors who may discount engagement
fees where specialist pricing in both markets appears to depend on audit firm characteristics and
market share.  Collectively, my results provide evidence that disclosure regulation is associated
with overall lower fees, but also results in greater concentration and specialist fee premiums.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The effects of financial statement disclosure regulation on the audit markets has been a
topic of interest to regulators for an extensive period of time. Exempted from federal disclosure
mandates under provisions of the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, the disclosure requirements
of local governmental units have been delegated largely to state lawmakers, presenting a unique
opportunity to use the governmental auditing markets as a basis for examining consequences of
variation in state-based disclosure mandates on independent audit firm market structure and audit
engagement pricing. For a sample of local governmental units reporting under the Single Audit
Act, I find disclosure regulation is associated with increases in auditor concentration levels as
well as the extent of auditor specialization maintained within a market. Additionally, I find that
regulated disclosure may result in auditing efficiencies, or economies of scale, evidenced through
overall lower audit pricing. I also find evidence suggesting the effect of disclosure regulation on
specialist audit firm pricing may be a function of both regulatory characteristics as well as
characteristics of the auditing firms operating in a given local market where disclosure regulation
is associated with specialist auditor fee premiums present at varying levels between specialist
firms.  Similar pricing premiums are not found in the voluntary disclosure setting.
In a recent discussion paper Enhancing Audit Quality: Plans and Perspectives for the
U.S. CPA Profession, the AICPA has identified audits conducted under Government Auditing
Standards (GAS), including engagements performed under the Single Audit Act, as being an area
of challenge for independent auditing (AICPA 2014). Emphasizing the importance of market
structure and the high levels of audit risk inherent in governmental auditing common among
independent auditing firms of all sizes, the AICPA discussion paper suggests audit risk is
especially present when engagements conducted under GAS represent a relatively low volume of
2
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a firm’s overall engagement work and the AICPA is currently proposing changes to the peer
review program as a means of addressing the resultant engagement risk. Similarly, in a 2007
examination undertaken by the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE 2007) the
reporting quality of recipients of federal awards under the Single Audit Act was examined
finding evidence suggesting that auditor experience and training is directly related to engagement
effectiveness in auditing recipients of federal awards.  Taken collectively with the AICPA’s
proposals, the PCIE’s findings suggest benefits can be derived from governmental auditing
markets containing increased levels of auditor specialization.
Audit firm characteristics and their impact on reporting under the Single Audit Act have
been examined by regulators since the establishment of single audit reporting.1 In 1986, the
GAO released a report finding that approximately one-third of single audits failed to conform to
professional standards.  Later GAO reports (2008, 2007, 2006, 2003) contained similar
conclusions while consistently noting that auditor expertise in serving recipients of federal
awards was associated with higher reporting quality.  Despite the findings of regulators, audit
specialization is not observed to the same extent in all audit markets.  My study suggests that
state-level disclosure regulation may be a contributing factor towards differences in audit firm
market structure and that local-level reporting regulation may influence auditor contracting in
ways different than the effects of reporting regulation at a national level as seen through
provisions of the Single Audit Act or through the empirical findings and suggestions proposed by
regulatory bodies such as the GAO or PCIE.
Regulation is a defining feature of the modern audit markets, and globally the trend is
towards increasing oversight of the financial reporting and auditing process (DeFond and Zhang
1 The Single Audit Act was established in 1984 and was enacted to standardize the requirements for auditing federal
programs. The Act is formally described in Section II of this study.
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2014). Therefore, studying the relation between reporting regulation and the auditing markets is
an important dimension towards understanding the market positioning and audit pricing
characteristics of independent auditing firms. The governmental audit markets provide a unique
setting for examining this relationship as governmental accounting is not only a complex process
that should lend itself towards high levels of auditor specialization (Hogan and Jeter 1999), but
differences in the required disclosure between states makes it difficult for auditing firms to
service governmental units in multiple states (Chase 1999). Therefore, in many ways, each state
may represent its own audit market.
These characteristics, combined with GAO findings of “lowest bid” auditor selection
(GAO 1986), yield an auditing market that is fragmented in the sense there has historically been
little Big 4 presence and where most governmental units are served primarily by local auditors,
providing geographically bounded audit markets useful in conducting an interstate market
comparison. When governmental units operate in a disclosure regulated setting, I predict that
state-level oversight of the reporting process contributes towards developing more concentrated
audit markets where efficiencies gained through auditing under a regulated setting may be
associated with audit pricing economies.
The accounting literature identifies several benefits associated with auditor specialization.
First, specialization may provide scale economies that can lower the average engagement cost
per client and secondly, specialization may provide higher audit fees due to product
differentiation (see Gramling and Stone 2001 for a literature review). Though audit firms are
developing along specialized industry lines, the fact that auditor specialization is not observed to
the same extent in all industries, suggests some unobserved economic reason prevents the
transfer of specialized auditing knowledge within certain marketplaces or the demand for
4
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specialized services does not exist within some markets (Hogan and Jeter 1999; Craswell,
Francis and Taylor 1995).  In my study, I predict that reporting regulation alters auditor demand
where auditor specialization becomes valued and a firm’s established market niche can result in
pricing premiums that may not be conducive in a voluntary disclosure environment.
I conduct my study in both a disclosure regulated and a voluntary disclosure market
during the period 1997-2010 using two states that share similar design of local governments but
exhibit significant reporting differences.2 One state (Michigan) has a long-standing GAAP
disclosure requirement; the other state (Pennsylvania) has similar characteristics except it does
not have a statutory GAAP reporting requirement. I find that audit firm concentration levels are
higher in the GAAP-regulated market than in the unregulated market.  Notably, during the period
of my study, there was a change in policy resulting in increased regulation (GAAP requirement)
for county form governments within the unregulated state.  Following this change, there was an
increase in auditor concentration for county governments as compared with other unregulated
governmental units within Pennsylvania.  As a result, I provide evidence both between states and
within one state suggesting that local-level reporting regulation impacts auditor market
concentration levels.
Using survey data, I find that audit fees are lower in the GAAP-regulated state, evidence
indicative of economies of scale in engagement pricing. However, in the regulated environment,
the established market leader earns a fee premium, consistent with benefits to specialization due
to regulation (Eichenseher and Danos 1981; Danos and Eichenseher 1982; Hogan and Jeter
1999).  Other market leaders within the regulated environment also earn a fee premium,
however, that premium is not as significant as that of the established leader.  In contrast, I find
2 I follow prior literature in defining a state with GAAP mandated disclosure as being “regulated” and conversely, a
state without a statutory GAAP requirement as being disclosure “unregulated” or “voluntary.”
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evidence of fee discounting associated with the market leader in the non-regulated state,
suggesting that premiums associated with specialist auditing may be a function of both
individual audit firm characteristics (or market positioning) and demand driven for auditor type
by local level regulation.
The remainder of the study proceeds as follows.  Section 2 presents background
information.  Section 3 discusses the development of the research hypotheses.  Section 4
describes the sample, and Section 5 provides an analysis of the structure of the CPA firm
markets including an analysis of firm concentration measures as well as an analysis of regulation
and specialization levels on audit fees.  Section 6 provides a discussion of the sensitivity testing
performed and Section 7 is the conclusion and discussion.
6
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2. BACKGROUND
2.1 State-Based Reporting Regulation
State legislatures establish the minimum financial disclosure requirements for local
governmental units.  These requirements may range from full disclosure “GAAP” based
financial statements through unregulated or voluntary disclosure with many states adopting their
own hybrid methods of reporting and collecting financial information from local governmental
units. In my study, I refer to local governments required under state statute to follow
pronouncements of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) as following
“GAAP” and conversely, local governments in states exercising voluntary disclosure as “non-
GAAP” states.3,4
The extent of GAAP reporting followed by local governments is largely unknown but is
of concern to regulatory bodies who encourage its adoption (GASB 2008). In a study sponsored
by the GASB, it was estimated that nationally, approximately 43% of county governments and
13% of local municipalities are required under state statute to issue their financial statements on
a GAAP basis (GASB 2008).  Surveys conducted by the National Association of State Auditors,
Comptrollers and Treasurers (NASACT) also estimate wide variation in state reporting
mandates. In the accounting literature, research conducted by Baber and Gore (2008) examined
state reporting mandates and finds approximately 27 states require GAAP, 14 follow state-
specific disclosure, and 9 states have unregulated disclosure.
3 GAAP-based reporting standards are established by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB), the
governmental accounting equivalent to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB).
4 GAAP states typically mandate full disclosure financial statements filed on either an annual or semi-annual basis in
accordance with state laws.  Non-GAAP states have no formal disclosure requirements and outside of any
confounding factors, those municipalities are free to issue financial statements on a fund basis, cash basis, hybrid
basis, etc.
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The debate concerning why some states mandate GAAP while others do not is beyond
the scope of this paper. However, Zimmerman (1977) proposes the high administrative cost
assumed by a local government to prepare GAAP-based financial statements and the limited
utility gained by voters of the heightened disclosure levels has potentially limited lobbying
activity for a uniform GAAP requirement.5 Despite the inherent complexity of governmental
accounting and preparing a report under GAAP, the GASB has continued to propose standards
(GASB 34 and GASB 45, among others) aimed at addressing the usability of governmental
financial statements; however, unless larger incentives on the part of voters and elected officials
to monitor government finances exist, Ingram and Spring (1984) and Ingram and DeJong (1987)
suggests lower levels of accounting information will be voluntarily disclosed, absent disclosure
mandates under state regulations.
2.2 The Single Audit Act
Each year, the federal government awards greater than $400 billion in grants to various
governmental and non-profit organizations.  Under the Single Audit Act of 1984, any recipient
organization expending federal awards greater than $500,000 ($300,000 for fiscal years ending
before January 1, 2004) must undergo an independent audit in accordance with requirements of
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-133 “Audits of States, Local
Governments and Non-Profit Organizations.”  In this unique environment, financial statements
and supplemental information commonly referred to as “Single Audits” are required to be filed
with the Federal Audit Clearinghouse, and portions of those financial statements are publicly
available.
5 In this study my comparisons examine consequences of statutory reporting policy on the overall audit markets
rather than the effects of individual government reporting, as some local governments may adopt GAAP
presentation either voluntarily or as a requirement of supplemental financing.
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Single Audits are performed in accordance with Governmental Auditing Standards
(GAS) issued by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) and contain a heightened
level of specific reporting dealing with a recipient organization’s internal control activities and
the grantee’s compliance with specific program requirements.  The standards require audit firms
to administer specialized training for in-charge engagement team members and that auditors
must issue an opinion on both the financial statements as well as on the grantee’s compliance
with terms of the federal programs including compliance with laws and regulations, as well as
whether the schedule of expenditures of federal awards is prepared properly. Additionally, under
OMB Circular A-133, auditing firms must report their assessment of a recipient organization’s
internal controls and report any instances of noncompliance as either a reportable condition or
material weakness. While the internal controls assessment is similar in purpose to reporting on
internal controls for commercial entities, the reporting of control assessments under the Single
Audit Act is not identical to that of a publicly-traded entity.6
2.3 Auditing Markets of Local Governmental Units
The auditing of local governmental units is unique in its nature where the inherent
complexities (fund accounting, GASB pronouncements) found in governmental accounting
should lend themselves towards heightened specialist use (Hogan and Jeter 1999). Additionally,
there are underlying differences in market structure between firms serving governmental entities
versus firms serving publicly-traded entities where the vast majority of governmental auditing is
performed by state-based or regional independent auditing practices. Though the scope and
6 To maintain consistent terminology with pronouncements of the AICPA (i.e., SAS 112), during 2007 the GAO
replaced references to “reportable conditions” with the term “significant deficiency.”  Since my sample period
begins prior to the GAO’s change, I continue to use the term “reportable conditions” throughout this study.  I also
note that the reporting and testing of internal controls for recipients of federal awards under these programs has been
required well before similar testing for commercial entities.
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complexity of governmental audit work is wider than that of a comparable commercial entity,
governmental audits are typically less costly for auditees than comparable engagements overseen
by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) (Petrovits, Shakespeare, and
Shih 2011) and given practice management and resource constrains at the Big N auditing firms,
it has been found that most governmental auditing work formerly serviced by the Big N firms is
shifting to local practices in a fashion similar to what has been noted for not-for-profit entities
(Feng and Elder 2014).7
Supporting the notion that audit contracting and audit firm involvement within
governmental auditing is an important dimension of single audit compliance are the numerous
findings of the GAO. Initially, the GAO expressed concerns the independent auditing markets
and audit quality could be negatively impacted by “lowest cost” selection norms used in auditor
procurement (GAO 1986; Copeland and Ingram 1978).  Subsequent GAO reports began
encouraging governmental units to consider audit firm expertise and training as signals of audit
quality in making audit firm selection decisions (GAO 1987; PCIE 2007). In the GAO’s analysis
of audit quality, their analysis has maintained a focus on the independent auditing process (i.e.,
compliance with professional fieldwork standards) rather than the extent of financial statement
disclosure mandates, leaving the question of the relationship between required disclosure levels
under a comprehensive state policy and auditor market structure largely unknown.
2.4 Regulation and the Independent Auditing Markets
Prior research findings suggest that accounting and disclosure practices of local
governmental units adjust through a relationship between political incentives and the desired
7 In my sample, I note that the Big N never audited the majority of local governments, but in the years since passage
of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, their involvement in the local governmental markets has further decreased to
negligible levels.
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monitoring levels of voters (Ingram and Spring 1984; Evans and Patton 1983; Baber 1983;
Zimmerman 1977).  Built upon the notion that the federal government (outside of possible single
audit compliance) imposes relatively few disclosure requirements on governmental units and
instead relies upon the independent auditing process as a means of reducing information
asymmetry (Ingram and Spring 1984), these studies all suggest that variation in audit demand
and disclosure levels emerge as a result of signaling and economic incentives that accrue to
either voters or the elected officials themselves (Evans and Patton 1987; Zimmerman 1977).
Outside the trade-offs between political incentives and voter monitoring, a statutory
GAAP mandate as a component of a comprehensive state policy establishes a minimum
disclosure level all governmental units must follow.  The centralized process state governments
may use in reviewing municipal financial statements prepared under a GAAP mandate provides
an environment through which the effects of state policies on the audit markets can be examined
and my study argues that, dependent upon the nature of municipal oversight provided by state
regulators, the contracting for independent auditing may be impacted.
Recent empirical evidence suggests state-based GAAP policies are significant
determinants impacting contracting costs and ultimately affecting financing outcomes.  These
studies, (Ingram and Copeland 1981; Gore 2004; Baber and Gore 2008; Vermeer, Styles and
Patton 2012; Baber, Gore, Rich and Zhang 2013; Rich and Zhang 2014) collectively find the
information environment common in a GAAP-regulated setting impacts user groups of
municipal financial statements. My study provides evidence suggesting that not only does a
centralized GAAP requirement impact municipal disclosure levels but it may also impact
structural characteristics of the audit markets serving governmental units.
11
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3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
In framing my hypotheses, I make several assumptions.  First, in the absence of
disclosure regulation, municipal reporting may revert to the most cost effective means possible,
fund accounting (Watts and Zimmerman 1986). Additionally, the demand for independent
auditing would similarly be reduced as substitute mechanisms of information (news, voting, and
taxes) could equally provide signals of fiscal stability (Ingram and Copeland 1981; Wallace
1980).  Lastly, I assume the goal of independent auditing firms is to maximize firm profits in
competitive markets while providing the level of services contracted for by auditees. And, as
audit firm profits are unobservable, I use audit firm market share and audit engagement pricing
as units of analysis and assume both determinants interact with local level regulation and adjust
to equilibrium through competition (Weiss 1989).
3.1 Disclosure Regulation and Auditor Market Structure
Auditing in the governmental markets presents its own unique challenges (fund
accounting, single audit reporting, GASB pronouncements) but when the complexities of
governmental accounting are compounded through state regulation, another layer of monitoring
is added to the equation and may impact the composition of the independent audit markets.
Studies by Hogan and Jeter (1999) and Eichenseher and Danos (1981) predict that levels of
reporting complexity relate directly to levels of independent auditor concentration. Similarly,
Eichenseher and Danos (1986; 1982) predict a positive relationship between regulation levels
and auditor concentration within a given market concluding that levels of firm market share can
be sustained over time when regulation levels are high, and firm market shares may erode in the
absence of regulation.
12
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Bain (1956) concludes there is a cumulative effect of scale and product differentiation
barriers that, if developed, may deter entry into certain markets thereby increasing supplier
concentration levels. Defond and Zhang (2014) note that regulated disclosure places a floor on
the demand for certain types of reporting and auditing which may be highlighted by intervention
of regulatory bodies.  Combined, this environment may incentivize a shift in both client demand
and firm participation in the auditing markets where differences in demand are illustrated by the
predominant auditor types or market concentration characteristics within a given market.
Therefore, I propose my first hypothesis:
H1: Disclosure regulation will lead to differences in auditor concentration levels.
3.2 Disclosure Regulation and Independent Audit Pricing
Given a requisite level of auditor concentration and disclosure regulation, it is not clear to
what extent these characteristics impact audit engagement pricing.  Traditional economic
arguments suggest pricing rises with concentration (Weiss 1989) however, the settings used in
classical economics literature addresses supplier concentration through oligopolistic theories.
The auditing markets included in my study do not contain levels of concentration sufficient to
suggest the absence of competition and regulators have struggled to find empirical evidence of
collusive pricing within the auditing markets, therefore, my study assumes the audit markets are
competitive (GAO 2008, 2003).
Despite findings of a competitive audit market, the accounting literature is mixed in
regards to the relationship between auditor concentration and audit pricing, with some authors
finding a direct relationship between auditor concentration and engagement pricing (Carson,
Simnett, Soo and Wright 2012; Bandyopadhyay and Kao 2001, 2004) and others finding
evidence suggestive of engagement discounting or lower fees associated with auditor
13
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concentration (Chase 1999; Pearson and Trompeter 1994; Simunic 1980).  Collectively, the
disparity in research findings indicates that unobserved characteristics may impact audit firm
pricing, leaving the relationship between concentration levels and audit pricing not fully
understood.
Chase (1999) suggests that local government reporting regulation generates homogeneity
within the independent audit process.8 Over time, the delivery of fixed levels of auditing
throughout a marketplace lends itself towards economies of scale, where DeFond, Francis and
Wong (2000) find specialist auditors grant fee discounts. In disclosure regulated settings, there
should be an established demand for auditing services as a defined set (GAAP) of reporting
criteria must be followed.9 Given the fixed quantities of auditing demanded, and disclosure
levels sustaining the marketplace’s concentration over time (Danos and Eichenseher 1986,
1982), I anticipate that economies of scale should develop evidenced through lower engagement
fees in a disclosure regulated environment.
Absent disclosure regulation, local governments will voluntarily adopt their optimal level
of disclosure based upon monitoring incentives (Watts and Zimmerman 1986).  In this setting,
auditing economies may develop over time but not to the same extent found in a disclosure
regulated setting (Danos and Eichenseher 1986, 1982).  Therefore, I predict that when
governmental audit markets contain disclosure regulation, economies of scale develop more
8 Chase (1999) notes that the county governments included in his study are required by the Auditor of Public
Accounts (not statute) to issue a Comprehensive Annual Financial Statement (“CAFR’s” are usually considered
GAAP) and argues as a result, the reporting and auditing process is homogenous between sampled governmental
units contributing towards his findings of lower audit fees associated with higher concentration levels. The Chase
sample includes a substantial portion (12.5%) served by Big N auditors and approximately 60% of the remaining
entities served by the specialist firm, which Chase concluded to be discounting in light of Big N competition.
9 For example, in addition to enforcing a GAAP mandate, the disclosure regulated state used in this study
(Michigan) has issued uniform reporting formats for the financial statements of governmental units, and routinely
updates this manual for major changes in GASB pronouncements (i.e., GASB 34), increasing the homogeneity of
reporting in this type of environment.  A sample of the requirements are available at:
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/unifrepformatgasb34_47528_7.PDF
14
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extensively within the auditing process and those economies are returned to auditees, without
disclosure regulation, the economies of scale may not develop to the same extent.  Therefore, I
propose my second hypothesis:
H2: Disclosure regulation results in auditing efficiencies and economies of scale in
audit engagement pricing.
3.3 Disclosure Regulation and Demand for Auditor Specialization
The GAO has recognized a rebalancing of auditing firms along specialized industry lines
(GAO 2003).  This suggests that audit firm differentiation strategies do impact independent audit
firm market structure, especially in unique industries or settings where industry knowledge may
create competitive advantage, with the implicit understanding that auditor expertise can be priced
(GAO 2003).  Despite this trend, the accounting literature contains mixed conclusions on the
relationship between the demand for auditor specialization and its impact on audit engagement
pricing.
Demsetz (1974) suggests that more efficient firms win both profits and market share.
Using engagement fees as a proxy for profits, it remains uncertain under what circumstances
auditing firms maintain market share, classifying themselves as industry specialists, while also
maintaining pricing premiums.  DeFond et al. (2000) argue that when specialization results in
economies of scale, auditors grant fee discounts. Recent evidence exploring competitive factors
within the auditing markets finds that auditors retain a specialist fee premium if their market
positioning allows them to do so (Numan and Willekens 2012; Mayhew and Wilkins 2003).
Audit fees represent the extent of engagement effort a firm anticipates spending on a
given engagement and auditors cannot unilaterally charge higher fees unless there is a
corresponding increase in auditee demand for additional effort or industry knowledge.  In the
15
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governmental audit markets, Chase (1999) finds that a large specialist firm discounts
engagement fees, Ward, Elder and Kattelus (1994) find that specialist firms earn a fee premium,
and Rubin (1988) and Lowensohn, Johnson, Elder and Davies (2007) do not find a relationship
between non Big N specialist firms and audit engagement fees.  Collectively, these results
indicate that market conditions generating demand for fee premium audit specialization remain
an unresolved question in the accounting literature. I predict that with disclosure regulation, the
additional monitoring of local governmental units not only generates changes in audit firm
market structure, but also creates demand for specialist audit firms who have experience in the
disclosure-regulated environment and these specialist firms can price that experience dependent
upon the firm’s positioning within a given market.  Therefore I propose my third and fourth
hypothesis:
H3: Disclosure regulation generates demand for audit specialization.
H4: Audit specialization fee premiums are a function of disclosure regulation and
characteristics of the auditing firms operating in a disclosure regulated market.
16
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4. SAMPLE SELECTION
4.1 Selection of Comparison States
To explore the consequences of differences in disclosure policy on the audit markets, I
selected two states (Michigan and Pennsylvania) as a basis for performing a market comparison.
Interstate comparisons have been used in similar studies examining the effects of public policy
on audit market behavior.  These studies (Hackenbrack, Jensen and Payne 2000; Jensen and
Payne 2005) used geographically similar states in their analysis and while the states were not
perfectly similar, the studies were able to control for confounding factors through their research
design. Gore (2004) notes that as the number of states in an analysis increases, the possibility of
correlated omitted variables rises as states are unique (Chase 1999) in their specific reporting
requirements.
The selection of Michigan and Pennsylvania as the sample states provides many
empirical strengths in addition to shared proximity. First, Michigan has required GAAP
reporting since 1968.10 Through nearly 50 years of GAAP enforcement, the Michigan
governmental audit market provides an opportunity to examine market and pricing consequences
emerging from a setting that may have altered auditee/auditor contracting incentives, lending
towards increased levels of audit specialization and stability in firm market share over time as a
consequence of regulation (Danos and Eichenseher 1982, 1986).  Pennsylvania is a suitable
comparison state as local governments within Pennsylvania are not required under statute to
report on a GAAP basis.11 More notably, during the period of my study, Pennsylvania
10 Michigan Public Act 2 of 1968 (MCL 141.421 to 141.440a) formalizes the adoption of GAAP (GASB standards)
to be followed by governmental units and charges the State Treasurer with providing implementation guidance to
the governmental units.
11 Approximately 97% of Pennsylvania’s local governments are not required under law to submit full GAAP based
financial statements.  These governments may submit the required information using any reporting basis, including
cash basis (Patrick 2010).
17
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Commonwealth County Code was amended requiring county governments to report on a GAAP
basis, providing further opportunity to test the market concentration hypothesis between states
and also within one state.12,13
The two states share many common characteristics making them suitable comparison
states used in prior studies (Vermeer et al. 2012; Gore 2004).  For example, the reporting of
governmental units within each state does not overlap, meaning each government (county, city,
etc.) reports on and is audited on its own financial operations.  Secondly, the two states share a
similar design of their local governments in that both states utilize county, city, township and
other local government forms such as villages and boroughs.  Additionally, both states require
governmental units to undergo audits and the majority of these audits are performed by
independent CPA firms and none of the CPA firms report on governmental units in both
state.14,15 The main variation in the financial monitoring of the governmental units comes in the
administration of the GAAP requirement. In Michigan, oversight of GAAP compliance is
centralized and regularly reviewed and tested by state auditors, and governments not found to be
reporting in accordance with GAAP are required to submit corrected financial statements.  In
Pennsylvania, a summary of selected financial data is to be submitted to the Department of
Community and Economic Development (DCED) on an annual basis but full disclosure is not
12 Pennsylvania Commonwealth County Code 2002 (Section 1705, P.L. 323, No. 130) was enacted by the 2002
General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.  Section 1705 required the adoption of GAAP reporting
for county governments to take effect the third full fiscal year (2005) after enactment of the legislation.
13 It would be ideal to also test a regulatory change in a state moving from GAAP disclosure to voluntary disclosure.
However, given the shifts in accounting and auditing towards increased regulation (DeFond and Zhang 2014), there
is minimal potential to find this scenario in a suitable comparison market.
14 It is fairly common for the auditing of local governments to be performed by state auditors, rather than CPA firms.
However, in the single audit sample drawn from these two states, the vast majority of auditing is provided by
independent CPA firms.
15 Not all governmental auditing is performed by independent CPAs.  For example, boroughs and townships in
Pennsylvania may be audited by either elected auditors, an elected controller, or independent CPA’s.  The elected
auditor form is most common in smaller governmental units.
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required nor is there a strong enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance with state or GASB
requirements (Patrick 2010).16
Providing an environment where the policies pertaining to reporting regulation can be
examined outside the confounding effects of disclosure choices of individual governmental units,
I draw my sample from all local governments in Michigan and Pennsylvania reporting under the
Single Audit Act.  In addition to holding the disclosure levels comparable between all sampled
entities, the Single Audit Act provides many strengths to my research design. All local
governments are eligible to receive federal awards and a government’s ability to obtain federal
awards is not limited by state policy. Additionally, the nature of auditing under the Single Audit
Act (and dollar thresholds) results in a sample where all sampled governmental units receive
both additional audit focus addressing the administration of their federal programs but also, the
dollar limits inherent in single audit reporting lends towards larger government sizes, alleviating
the need to arbitrarily drop observations based upon factors such as population.17 Lastly, the
single audit data available from the Federal Audit Clearinghouse contains auditor specific
characteristics such as the auditor name, federal awards dollars, and a classification of internal
control exceptions as well as auditee contact information necessary for administering survey
instruments.
16 Pennsylvania requires local governments to submit their financial information on a form (DCED-CLGS 30 –
Municipal Annual Audit and Financial Report).  This form focuses on budgetary items such as revenues,
expenditures, and long-term debt and does not require submission of information on current assets, fixed assets or
current liabilities.
17 Size restrictions based upon population are common in the governmental literature.  For example Gore (2004)
limits her analysis to governments with populations greater than 10,000; Rubin (1988) limits his analysis to cities
with populations greater than 50,000.  Using the single audit data is another technique to address size restrictions
while also providing a level of homogeneity to the sample.
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4.2 Market Analysis Sample
Table 1, Panel A describes the sample selection for my first hypothesis.  I begin my study
with all local governments submitting a financial statement in accordance with A-133 for the
years 1997 through 2010 (Panel A).18 Excluded from my analysis are governmental units where
the auditor selection may be driven by factors different from the remainder of my sample.  This
includes 74 engagements completed by state auditors as previous research by Lopez and Peters
(2010) finds differences in audit quality between engagements performed by independent CPA
firms and those completed by state auditors.  Additionally, engagements completed by state
auditors are excluded as these engagements are not subject to an independent CPA firm’s quality
control and peer review process, making pricing comparisons not comparable between audit
services provided by CPA firms and state auditors.
Jensen and Payne (2005) found that in the years after a bidding restriction in Florida was
lifted, the Big N firms left the marketplace for governmental auditing services.  Similarly, Feng
and Elder (2014) find the Big N firms reduced their presence in the non-profit audit market after
the passage of SOX.  I also observe this trend in my data as the Big N reduced their presence in
the municipal audit market in both states; this relationship becomes more apparent in the years
post-SOX.  In 1997, the Big N audited 15 (10) governments in Pennsylvania (Michigan); in
2010, comparable numbers were 3 (1), respectively.  Accordingly, in order to avoid a result
driven by Big N firms, these observations are excluded from my study, allowing the opportunity
to conduct this analysis without the confounding effects of firms who can draw competitive
advantage through a national client base.19
18 The year 1997 is the first year the Federal Audit Clearinghouse began making single audit data available.
19 In addition to building upon prior research findings, I observe that engagements performed by Big N firms are
disproportionately larger than those performed by other CPA firms and are more likely to represent a client/CPA
firm match on size rather than based on the contracting choices observed in the remainder of my sample.
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Final Sample by Government Form and Audit Year, partitioned by State
Pennsylvania Michigan
Audit Year
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Total
Sample
1997 51 31 9 12 103 59 57 5 0 121 224
1998 51 39 13 10 113 60 62 10 6 138 251
1999 53 36 13 13 115 60 77 9 7 153 268
2000 50 35 21 17 123 64 78 16 9 167 290
2001 55 39 30 29 153 63 85 20 13 181 334
2002 58 40 33 27 158 67 86 21 18 192 350
2003 59 42 31 27 159 68 89 20 17 194 353
2004 61 39 25 15 140 62 71 13 12 158 298
2005 61 35 29 20 145 63 72 18 12 165 310
2006 62 35 27 22 146 63 73 13 24 173 319
2007 62 39 37 23 161 64 77 19 13 173 334
2008 62 36 23 24 145 65 82 19 13 179 324
2009 63 32 30 25 150 69 74 28 9 180 330
2010 50 26 21 21 118 74 101 31 12 218 336
Total 798 504 342 285 1,929 901 1,084 242 165 2,392 4,321
Panel B: Observations from Administration of Survey
Pennsylvania Michigan Total
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A-133 Filing
Governments
50 26 21 21 118 74 102 31 11 218 124 128 52 21 11 336
Surveys Returned 17 9 6 9 41 29 45 12 4 90 46 54 18 9 4 131
Response Rate in % 34% 35% 29% 43% 35% 39% 44% 39% 36% 41% 37% 42% 35% 43% 36% 39%
Useable Responses 17 7 5 9 38 27 42 12 3 84 44 49 17 9 3 122
I obtained my sample from the Federal Audit Clearinghouse Single Audit Database (https://harvester.census.gov).
Panel A summarizes sample observations by state and type of local government over time. In Panel B, I summarize
survey responses received by state and type of local government.
Table 1 Summary of Local Governments Included in Analysis
Panel A: Data for Longitudinal Analysis of Market Trends
Sample Selection Criteria and Identification of Observations, partitioned by State
Pennsylvania Michigan Total
Total local governments reporting under A-133 for 1997-2010 2,053 2,529 4,582
Less: A-133 reporting entities with atypical CPA firm contracting needs:
Entities submitting reports prepared by state auditors (13) (61) (74)
Entities with Big N audit firms (111) (76) (187)
Total local governments included in sample for the years 1997-2010 1,929 2,392 4,321
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In testing my first hypothesis, I use a 14-year time series of single audit data resulting in a
final sample of 4,321 observations including 1,929 observations from Pennsylvania and 2,392
from Michigan. The sample is summarized in Table 1.20 In Panel A, I report the breakdown of
observations by type of government and audit year.  Counties are the largest portion of the
sample with 1,699 observations, 798 in Pennsylvania and 901 in Michigan.  The sample includes
1,588 cities, including 504 in Pennsylvania and 1,084 in Michigan.  Townships, boroughs and
villages comprise the remainder of the sample with aggregate observations of 627 in
Pennsylvania and 407 in Michigan.
4.3 Survey of Independent Auditor Fees
My second and third and fourth hypothesis requires data not available through archival
sources.  Therefore, I surveyed fiscal year 2010 data from local governments within the states of
Michigan and Pennsylvania.  First, in February 2012, I conducted an electronically administered
pilot survey of the two states and performed an initial analysis.  Then, in April of 2012, I did a
formal mailing of surveys; this was followed with one final electronic mailing.  Early versus late
respondents were compared for response basis on the basis of audit fees, federal expenditure
dollars and population.  Additionally, nonresponse basis was checked on the basis of federal
expenditure dollars as this information is available for all entities through the Single Audit
Database.  In all cases, no evidence of response bias was noted.
Survey responses are summarized in Table 1, Panel B.  The overall response rate was
39% (Pennsylvania 35%; Michigan 41%) indicting a similar response based upon the balance of
observations between states. By focusing my study on two states, I was able to increase the
20 I note that overall, my sample includes on average 138 and 170 local governments drawn from Pennsylvania’s
2,632 local governments and Michigan’s 1,800 local governments, respectively.  The sample composition drawn
from the single audit act helps eliminate very small governments increasing the homogeneity of my sample.
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survey response rate to levels (39%) well in excess of that seen in most survey based research.21
Similar to other survey-based research, I received several surveys that did not contain useable
data.  The most common reason for an invalid survey response was the exclusion of audit fee
data.  Considering the research design used in hypothesis 2, 3 and 4, I was careful in wording the
survey so that fees pertaining to the completion of the financial statement audit were separately
considered from those of any consulting services provided.
21 Other survey-based studies and their response rates include Lowensohn et al. (2007) 28%; Vermeer, Raghunandan
and Forgione (2009) 14.4%; Ward et al. (1994) 60%; Simunic (1980) 33%; and Krishnan, Yetman and Yetman
(2006) 12%.
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5. RESEARCH DESIGN AND
EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR HYPOTHESIS TESTING
5.1 Regulation and Auditor Market Structure
I begin my review of the auditing markets by analyzing the number of audit firms
submitting A-133 reports in each state as compared with the overall number of A-133
engagements performed.  My sample is comprised of primarily local audit practices, most of
whom submit governmental engagements in just one state and out of relatively few offices
within that state.  Therefore, none of the sampled firms are able to gain competitive market
advantage through a national client base, providing a geographically bounded market where
confounding factors driven by Big N / large national firm market involvement is minimized.
In Figure 1, I summarize the governmental auditing markets for both Michigan and
Pennsylvania.  Figure 1 demonstrates how, despite Michigan having an overall greater number of
single audit reports submitted, this state has fewer auditing firms serving that market.
Correspondingly, in Pennsylvania, with fewer single audits completed, more firms are submitting
those reports suggesting increased auditor concentration levels associated with the GAAP-
regulated disclosure environment.
I test my first hypothesis concerning market concentration and the extent of market
involvement of the largest suppliers of auditing services through use of the Herfindahl Index and
concentration ratios, calculated for each state.  The Herfindahl Index, calculated as the sum of
squares of individual audit firm market shares, has been used in a large number of studies
(Bandyopadhyay and Kao 2004; Eichenseher and Danos 1981) as well as by regulators such as
the U.S. Department of Justice in order to assess levels of fair trade and market competition
among accounting firms.  Using concentration ratios, in conjunction with the Herfindahl Index
identifies the extent to which specific auditing firms serving the largest proportion of clients may
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differ between the regulated and unregulated setting and how the involvement of those firms
within the markets has changed over time.  I calculate the concentration ratios as the sum of
market shares (number of audits) of the top firms in each state and considering the predictions
made at the individual firm level in hypothesis 3 and 4, I separately analyze concentration ratios
for the top firm, top two firms and top four firms.22
Figure 1 Overview of Market Structure and CPA Firm Involvement
Figure 1 summarizes the overall structure of the A-133 reporting markets in Pennsylvania and Michigan during
the period 1997-2010. Using an aggregate fourteen year sample of 1,929 and 2,392 local governments in the
states of Pennsylvania and Michigan, respectively, drawn from the Federal Audit Clearinghouse Single Audit
Database (https://harvester.census.gov), I present both the number of audit engagements performed as well as the
number of firms performing those engagements in both states over time.
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the Herfindahl Index as well as of the
concentration ratios, partitioned by state.  The mean Herfindahl Index for the GAAP regulated
state (Michigan 0.11) is more than double the mean of the non-GAAP state (Pennsylvania 0.04)
22 My results are substantially similar calculating both industry concentration measures with federal expenditure
dollars audited per firm. The top 4 firm measure is typically used in the concentration literature.  I expand on this
and separately analyze the top firm and top two firms in further regression testing of my specialization hypothesis
and present the market concentration levels associated with those firms in Table 2.
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Pennsylvania Number
Engagements 103 115 153 159 145 161 150
Pennsylvania Number of Firms 60 60 77 74 68 73 67
Michigan Number of
Engagements 121 153 181 194 165 173 180
Michigan Number of
Firms 39 46 47 54 38 42 41
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and the difference of 0.07 is significant at p < 0.01; this relationship holds consistently
throughout the time series. For example, the Herfindahl Index in Pennsylvania was 0.03 in 1997
and increased to 0.05 by 2010. In comparison, the measure in Michigan remained consistent at
0.11 for both 1997 and 2010, respectively, with little deviation noted throughout the period.
The concentration ratios reported in Table 2 indicate that as measured by firm market
share, in all cases, the GAAP regulated state is significantly more concentrated than the
unregulated state (p < 0.01).  Over the fourteen year sample period, mean values in Pennsylvania
for the four-firm, two-firm and top-firm concentration ratios are 0.312, 0.216, and 0.128,
respectively.  Comparable values are 0.585, 0.416 and 0.224 for Michigan, evidencing
concentration levels approximately double that of the unregulated setting.  Consistent with the
notion of increased auditor concentration over time (Hogan and Jeter, 1999), my results
demonstrate slight gains in the market shares of top firms in both states over time however, my
results indicate that higher concentration levels may be associated with disclosure regulation.
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Table 2 Auditor Industry Concentration, Partitioned by State
Analysis of concentration measures for Pennsylvania local governments
Audit Obs. Herfindahl Concentration Ratios
Year Index Four Firm Two Firm Top Firm
1997 103 0.03 0.233 0.155 0.107
1998 113 0.03 0.257 0.168 0.124
1999 115 0.04 0.296 0.200 0.148
2000 123 0.04 0.276 0.187 0.114
2001 153 0.03 0.261 0.183 0.111
2002 158 0.03 0.272 0.196 0.114
2003 159 0.04 0.308 0.214 0.126
2004 140 0.04 0.329 0.214 0.136
2005 145 0.04 0.324 0.221 0.131
2006 146 0.04 0.336 0.240 0.123
2007 161 0.05 0.366 0.255 0.130
2008 145 0.05 0.372 0.262 0.159
2009 150 0.05 0.353 0.253 0.140
2010 118 0.05 0.390 0.271 0.136
Mean 1,929 0.04 0.312 0.216 0.128
Analysis of concentration measures for Michigan local governments
Audit Obs. Herfindahl Concentration Ratios
Year Index Four Firm Two Firm Top Firm
1997 121 0.11 0.562 0.421 0.231
1998 138 0.10 0.558 0.399 0.210
1999 153 0.09 0.542 0.373 0.203
2000 167 0.09 0.533 0.371 0.198
2001 181 0.11 0.558 0.414 0.216
2002 192 0.10 0.542 0.411 0.224
2003 194 0.09 0.525 0.387 0.222
2004 158 0.12 0.601 0.443 0.241
2005 165 0.14 0.667 0.491 0.261
2006 173 0.11 0.624 0.422 0.220
2007 173 0.12 0.624 0.434 0.231
2008 179 0.12 0.615 0.425 0.223
2009 180 0.12 0.633 0.422 0.228
2010 218 0.11 0.601 0.413 0.225
Mean 2,392 0.11 0.585 0.416 0.224
Diff in Means 4,321 0.07 0.273 0.200 0.096
Significance *** *** *** ***
Table 2 summarizes the extent of auditor concentration between the two states. Using data obtained from
the Federal Audit Clearinghouse Single Audit Database (https://harvester.census.gov), I present auditor
concentration statistics using both the Herfindahl Index as well as concentration ratios.  The table also
provides the difference in concentration between both states.
Significance = *** p<0.01
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5.2 Test of Regulatory Change
I utilize a change in Pennsylvania reporting regulation in order to provide further
evidence on the relationships between GAAP reporting regulation and independent auditor
concentration levels. Pennsylvania Commonwealth County Code 2002 (Section 1705, P.L.323,
No. 130) “the code” began requiring all Pennsylvanian county governments to submit their
financial statements using GAAP presentation beginning in 2005. Building on my hypothesis
that reporting regulation is directly related to auditor selection decisions, the independent
auditing markets relative to county governments in Pennsylvania should become more
concentrated in the periods after passage of the regulation while the regulation’s focus on county
governments allows me to use Pennsylvanian city governments as the control group within my
analysis.
Using both four-firm and two-firm concentration ratios and using city form governments
as a control group, I calculated concentration ratios for a three-year period before and after
passage of the code, leaving a three year adjustment period, as dictated under the regulation.
The choice of Pennsylvanian city governments as the unit of analysis in my control group is
suitable as both government forms operate locally and within the same state, minimizing
potentially confounding factors and enhancing the homogeneity of my sample (Lopez and Peters
2010; Giroux and McLelland 2003; Payne and Jensen 2002; McLelland and Giroux 2000).24
24 Since the code applied to the largest government forms in my sample (counties), it was not practical to match
individual county governments with comparably sized local governments within Pennsylvania.
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The univariate results in Table 3 indicate the increase in concentration for county
governments was significantly greater than the increase in concentration for city governments,
using both the four-firm and two-firm concentration ratios.  For example, the four-firm ratio for
counties increased from 0.449 to 0.546, an increase of 0.097 (p < 0.01).  In contrast, the same
ratio for cities only increased from 0.345 to 0.367, an increase of 0.022 (p < 0.01).  Testing the
proportion means found in county governments to city governments, my results suggest a
significant increase in concentration (p<0.01) reported in the post-regulatory change period for
county governments as compared with rates of change for city governments. These results
provide further support that local level disclosure regulation impacts audit market concentration
levels.
Table 3 Univariate Tests of Market Movement Following a Regulatory Change
Impacting Reporting Requirements of Pennsylvania County Governments
Audit Year Pre-Period (1999-2001) Post-Period (2005-2007)
Concentration Ratio Concentration Ratio Difference
Government
Form Obs.
Four
Firm
Two
Firm Obs.
Four
Firm
Two
Firm
Total
Obs.
Four
Firm
Two
Firm
County 158 0.449 0.335 185 0.546 0.395 343 0.097 *** 0.06 ***
City 110 0.345 0.236 109 0.367 0.248 219 0.022 *** 0.012 ***
Difference 268 0.104 *** 0.099 *** 294 0.179 *** 0.147*** 562 0.075 *** 0.048 ***
Significance = *** p < 0.01
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics and univariate testing of auditor concentration levels for
Pennsylvania county and city governments, partitioned based upon dates of a regulatory change.
Using data obtained from the Federal Audit Clearinghouse Single Audit Database
(https://harvester.census.gov), this table summarizes the impact of Pennsylvania Commonwealth
County Code 2002 (Section 1705, P.L. 323, No. 130) on the auditor concentration levels of county
governments within Pennsylvania and uses Pennsylvania city governments as a control group. The
table analyzes concentration using four-firm and two-firm concentration ratios and three-year trend
windows to test changes in auditor concentration within and between the two government forms
over time.
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5.3 Regulation and Audit Engagement Pricing
To test my second, third and fourth hypothesis, I develop a model of municipal audit fees
following a review of previous studies of the determinants of local government audit fees.
Collectively, these studies focused on U.S. municipalities and all used survey data to empirically
test their hypothesis (Baber, Brooks and Ricks 1987; Rubin 1988; Copley 1989; Ward et al.
1994; Hackenbrack et al. 2000; Jensen and Payne 2005).  I use the following OLS regression
specification to test my second and third hypothesis:= 0 + 1 + 2 +3 + 4 + 5 + 6 ++ 7 + 8 +9 + 10 + 11 ℎ +12 + 13 + 14 +15 + 16 +
Regulation
I measure disclosure regulation using an indicator variable to identify the GAAP-
regulated state (Michigan). Eichenseher and Danos (1981) and Danos and Eichenseher (1982,
1986) suggest economies of scale develop more fully in regulated settings.  Therefore, I expect
the consistent reporting and fixed levels of auditing present in the disclosure regulated setting to
generate economies of scale where those economies are returned to clients through the audit
contracting process.
Specialization Measures
I measure auditor specialization using both continuous and binary variables. Dopuch and
Simunic (1982) suggest specialist firms have greater industry knowledge of specific accounting
practices. Neal and Riley (2004) conclude specialist auditors distinguish themselves from other
accounting firms and note that specialists are industry leaders if they audit about 10 – 30% of a
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given audit market.25 In regards to audit pricing, auditors cannot unilaterally charge higher
engagement fees unless there is a corresponding increase in client demand for that additional
effort or expertise. DeFond and Zhang (2014) note that regulation places a floor on demand for
certain types of auditing where regulatory intervention may alter auditee/auditor client
alignment. I hypothesis that within the disclosure-regulated environment, there will be more
extensive demand for specialization where established specialist firms may distinguish
themselves and earn fee premiums based upon their market positioning and regulation.
I measure specialization first with a continuous variable representing the number of A-
133 engagements submitted by each respective firm (Deis and Giroux 1992).  This is followed
with two binary measures, first an indicator variable for firms auditing greater than 5% of the
markets and secondly, for firms auditing 10% or more of the market.26 My review of firm
concentration (Table 2) finds the effects of competition may vary between the top two producing
CPA firms in each state and I hypothesize the disclosure-regulated climate alters municipal
contracting by providing additional demand for audit specialists where fee premiums may be
more likely due to regulation. To test the effects of specialization on audit fees in each state by
CPA firm, I use an indicator variable to identify the top CPA firm (top two CPA firms) in each
state, thereby measuring specialization using both continuous and binary measures, and
supplement these results by analyzing specialization at the individual firm level.
25 I note that these studies are based upon samples drawn from predominately Big N-dominated markets where
concentration levels are significantly greater than the markets included in this study, therefore, in some regression
specifications, the identification of specialist auditors will be based upon a lower threshold.
26 I determine the cut off points for the two binary measures through a review of a scatterplot of firms and their
client bases while noting that specialization cutoffs at this level are not uncommon in the governmental auditing
literature; Bandyopadhyay and Kao (2001) used a similar specialization measure in some of their testing.
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Control Variables
I control for characteristics common in the municipal literature. Organizational
complexity, measured by population is the first size control. Prior studies (Ward et al. 1994;
Copley and Doucet 1993; Rubin 1988) find population to reflect agency incentives, such as
voting characteristics and the size of a government’s tax base, and found population to be a
significant determinant of audit fees. Federal expenditure levels, also a reflection of government
size, represents the extent of involvement a local government has within the A-133 program and
I predict should be directly related to audit fees.  I control for local government form with
indicator variables for county and city governments, respectively, and anticipate a direct
relationship between these two government forms and audit fees as Zimmerman (1977) argues
these governments are subject to additional agency considerations and potential conflicts of
interests between voters and politicians, suggesting the entities may carry different demand for
assurance services.  I control for factors such as local-level population density and economic
activity with an indicator variable if a local government is classified as being in an urban area as
defined by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and I predict higher audit fees
associated with urban-classified local governments.27
The Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) recommends local governments
adopt governance provisions such as internal audit functions and audit committees (GFOA
2008). Despite the GFOA’s recommendation, adoption of these bodies remains optional and
empirical evidence on their effectiveness in the governmental markets is limited. In the non-
profit sector, Vermeer et al. (2009) found evidence of a direct relationship between these
governing bodies and audit fees, concluding that organizations committed towards greater
27 The OMB classification of rural/urban counties was used in this study as it provides a clear delineation of census
activity useful in coding the local governments.
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internal oversight are more willing to incur additional costs for external monitoring. In the
governmental sector, Rich and Zhang (2014) found an inverse relationship between audit
committee formation and internal control deficiencies, suggesting these bodies play an active
monitoring role. Given these findings, I predict a positive relationship between internal audit
functions and audit committees and audit fees in my study.
I also control for characteristics pertaining to the relationship a local government has with
its audit firm. I measure auditor tenure through a six-level categorical variable and predict longer
tenure will be associated with greater audit fees. In a study of North Carolina county
governments, Baber, Brooks, and Ricks (1987) found evidence of lowballing in first year audit
fees of approximately 20%. Accordingly, I predict an inverse relationship between fees and
auditor changes. In the governmental sector, report qualifications are common and recurring,
although Ward et al. 1994 and Rubin 1988 did not find a significant relationship between
qualifications and audit fees. I control for report type with a categorical variable but do not make
a directional prediction.
Given the heightened level of oversight found in recipients of federal grants, as well as
the extent of supplemental reporting required when issuing control findings, I anticipate a direct
relationship between findings of material weaknesses and audit fees. Client financial expertise
should impact the auditing process, but the extent of this relationship on fees is uncertain in the
governmental sector. I control for financial expertise with an indicator variable representing
whether the local government’s chief financial officer is a CPA, but I do not make a directional
prediction. Lastly, Copley and Doucet (1993) found a direct relationship between competition for
an audit award and selection of a quality auditor while Rubin (1988) found an inverse
relationship on the joint effect of tenure and requisitioning on audit fees. I anticipate an inverse
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relationship between clients who obtained multiple bids during their contracting and whether
audit fees for the 2010 audit year were a component of a multi-year fee arrangement (bid year).
Further variable descriptions, including variable sources, are included in the Appendix.
Empirical results
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 4 (Panel A) for the full sample of survey
respondents, and partitioned separately (Table 4, Panel B) for respondents from Michigan and
Pennsylvania. The univariate statistics indicate that logged audit fees and government size
measured by population are not significantly different between the states. Also, the proportion of
local governments classified as urban is not significantly different between the two states. Total
federal expenditures are significantly higher in the unregulated state as is usage of an internal
audit function. 28 Additionally, I found no difference in the proportion of urban governments
between the two sampled states.
In terms of audit contracting, more audit bids are received in the regulated state, but
overall auditor tenure is longer. Additionally, in the regulated state, more unqualified audit
reports are issued and the single audit reports contain fewer material weaknesses, suggesting that
regulation enhances reporting quality. Collectively, the descriptive data are consistent with the
notion that active procurement is a determinant of quality auditor selection (GAO 1987; Copley
and Doucet 1993), and this relationship may also be enhanced through local level reporting
regulation. Table 4, Panel C, provides the frequency counts of binary and categorical variables.
28 The number of federal grants received is an alternative measure of a local government’s involvement in federal
programs and may also represent the extent of grant specific auditing effort. Univariate testing finds no difference in
federal grants received between states.  Additionally, this measure is not significant in regression analysis, therefore,
I relied upon federal expenditure dollars as an additional measure of a government’s size as well as of a local
government’s involvement in the federal programs.
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics and tests of significance of differences between Michigan
and Pennsylvania
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev.
Panel A: Total Sample (n = 122)
Continuous Measures
Total Audit Fees 46,228 34,375 38,557
Log Total Audit Fees 10.465 10.45 0.754
Population 62,777 21,382 130,246
Log Population 10.033 9.97 1.467
Federal Expenditures^ 5,819 1,735 12,800
Log Federal Expend 14.677 14.37 1.178
Bids received on audit 1.893 0.000 2.241
Binary Measures
County Government 0.361 - 0.482
City Government 0.402 - 0.492
Urban Government 0.582 - 0.495
Internal Audit 0.180 - 0.386
Audit Committee 0.213 - 0.411
Auditor Change 0.033 - 0.178
Material Weakness 0.393 - 0.491
Chief Officer is CPA 0.254 - 0.437
Bid Year 0.328 - 0.471
Categorical Measures
Audit Tenure 3.114 3.000 1.449
Type of Audit Report 3.951 4.000 0.217
Michigan (n = 84) Pennsylvania (n = 38)
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. T-Stat P-Value
Panel B: Subset of population by state government
Continuous Measures
Total Audit Fees 42,102 33,830 32,109 55,349 48,899 49,241 1.773 0.079*
Log Total Audit Fees 10.424 10.43 0.674 10.558 10.80 0.911 0.909 0.364
Population 55,239 21,000 140,835 79,439 40,700 102,805 0.491 0.625
Log Population 9.934 9.95 1.329 10.251 10.61 1.731 1.107 0.271
Federal Expenditures^ 4,420 1,532 12,300 8,911 4,507 13,400 1.812 0.073*
Log Federal Expend 14.442 14.24 1.057 15.197 15.32 1.275 3.419 0.001***
Bids received on audit 2.202 2.000 2.312 1.211 0.000 1.933 2.304 0.023**
Binary Measures
County Government 0.321 - 0.470 0.447 - 0.503 1.340 0.183
City Government 0.500 - 0.503 0.184 - 0.393 3.424 0.001***
Urban Government 0.583 - 0.496 0.579 - 0.500 0.045 0.964
Internal Audit 0.083 - 0.278 0.395 - 0.495 4.432 0.000***
Audit Committee 0.226 - 0.421 0.184 - 0.392 0.521 0.604
Auditor Change 0.035 - 0.185 0.026 - 0.162 0.267 0.789
Material Weakness 0.310 - 0.465 0.579 1.000 0.500 2.893 0.005***
Chief Officer is CPA 0.298 - 0.460 0.157 - 0.369 1.646 0.102
Bid Year 0.369 - 0.485 0.236 - 0.431 1.441 0.152
Categorical Measures
Audit Tenure 3.226 3.500 1.426 2.868 3.000 1.491 14.96 ~0.005***
Type of Audit Report 3.988 4.000 0.109 3.868 4.000 0.343 8.013 ~0.005***
^ in thousands ~ = Chi Sq.
*, **, *** represents significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed)
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TABLE 4 – Continued
Panel C: Frequency count of binary variables partitioned by state
Internal Audit Function Material Weakness Reported
Michigan Pennsylvania Total Michigan Pennsylvania Total
Yes Response 7 15 22 Reported 26 22 48
No Response 77 23 100 Not Reported 58 16 74
Total 84 38 122 Total 84 38 122
Audit Committee Function Chief Financial officer is a CPA
Michigan Pennsylvania Total Michigan Pennsylvania Total
Yes Response 19 7 26 CPA 25 6 31
No Response 65 31 96 Non CPA 59 32 91
Total 84 38 122 Total 84 38 122
Audit Change in 2010 Bid Year
Michigan Pennsylvania Total Michigan Pennsylvania Total
Switch 3 1 4 Bid Year 31 9 40
No Switch 81 37 118 Not Bid Year 53 29 82
Total 84 38 122 Total 84 38 122
Panel D: Frequency count of categorical variables partitioned by state
Auditor Tenure Type of Opinion Given
Michigan Pennsylvania Total Michigan Pennsylvania Total
1-3 Years 11 11 22 Unqualified 83 33 116
4-6 Years 21 3 24 Qualified 1 5 6
7-9 Years 10 12 22 Total 84 38 122
11-15 Years 21 4 25
>15 Years 21 8 29
Total 84 38 122
This table presents descriptive statistics for the total sample of survey respondents as well as the two subsamples of respondents
separated by the state of local government origin.  Panel A reports the differences in means between the two states using both T-
tests and Chi Square tests, as required. Panel B partitions the data based upon state.  Panel C shows the summary of binary
variables and their observed frequencies between the two states, Panel D shows the summary of categorical variables and their
observed frequencies between the two states.  Variable descriptions follow:
TOTAL AUDIT FEES is the natural log of fees paid to the independent CPA firm; LOG POPULATION is the natural log of a
governments population; LOG FEDERAL EXPENDITURES is the natural log of a government's federal expenditure dollars that
were reported on under section A133;  COUNTY is 1 if the local government is a county form, else 0; CITY is 1 if the local
government is a city form, else 0; URBAN GOVERNMENT is 1 if the local government is contained in an urban county;
INTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTION is 1 if the local government had an internal audit function, else 0; AUDIT COMMITTEE is 1 if
the local government had an audit committee, else 0; AUDIT TENURE a categorical variable with 1 representing the shortest
auditor tenure and 6 representing the longest auditor tenure; AUDITOR CHANGE is 1 if the government switched firms for the
2010 audit, else 0; MATERIAL WEAKNESS is 1 if the local government reported a material weakness within their A-133
submission, else 0; TYPE OF AUDIT REPORT is a categorical variable with 1 equal to an adverse opinion and 4 equal to an
unqualified opinion; CPA is 1 if the senior financial officer at the local government is a CPA, else 0; BIDS RECEIVED a
continuous measure of the number of bids the local government received from its most recent bidding proposal; BID YEAR is 1 if
2010 is an audit year included as a component of a multiyear fee arrangement, else 0.
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Table 5 presents the Pearson correlation matrix for the variables using the continuous
measure of specialization. Similar to most audit fee research, municipal size measured through
population and federal expenditure dollars expended is significantly related to audit fees, a
finding consistent with results found in similar studies such as Rubin (1988).The measures of
specialization are interaction terms between firm market share and state regulation, therefore, a
requisite level of correlation is expected between the specialization measures and the regulation
variable. Most other correlation coefficients are similar in direction and statistical magnitude to
those of prior studies which examine fee regression models in governmental audit research.
Regression Results
I report regression results in Table 6 using the continuous measure of auditor
specialization as well as the two binary measures of auditor specialization.  Significance levels
are computed using White’s correction for heteroscedasticity.  The models are all significant at p
< 0.01.  The model R2 values are all approximately 80%.  The explanatory power of the models
is similar to other governmental audit fee research (e.g., Chase 1999; Ward et al. 1994). All
variance inflation factors are below 4.0, indicating multicollinearity is not likely a problem.
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Log Audit Fees 1.00
Regulation 1=MI 0=PA -0.08 1.00
MI Specialization Measure 0.37*** 0.58*** 1.00
PA Specialization Measure 0.31*** -0.66*** -0.38 *** 1.00
Log Population 0.80*** -0.10 0.23 *** 0.34*** 1.00
Log Federal Expenditures 0.60*** -0.30*** 0.00 0.37*** 0.65*** 1.00
County 0.33*** -0.12 -0.11 0.24*** 0.57*** 0.47*** 1.00
City 0.01 0.30*** 0.30 *** -0.16* -0.19** -0.30*** -0.62*** 1.00
Urban Government 0.37*** 0.01 0.27 *** 0.06 0.26*** 0.23*** -0.26*** 0.15* 1.00
Internal Audit Function 0.33*** -0.38*** -0.22 ** 0.40*** 0.33*** 0.40*** 0.36*** -0.25*** -0.08 1.00
Audit Committee 0.19** 0.05 0.06 -0.04 0.20** 0.17* 0.15* 0.02 -0.05 0.17* 1.00
Audit Tenure 0.11 0.11 0.24 *** -0.19** -0.03 -0.09 -0.17** 0.00 0.07 -0.01 -0.03 1.00
Auditor Change -0.15* 0.02 -0.13 -0.07 -0.09 0.03 0.05 -0.06 -0.12 -0.09 0.02 -0.27*** 1.00
Material Weakness 0.24*** -0.26*** 0.00 0.35*** 0.08 0.11 0.02 -0.04 0.11 0.10 -0.05 0.04 -0.05 1.00
Type of Audit Report 0.15* 0.26*** 0.12 -0.10 -0.01 0.07 0.01 -0.12 0.00 0.01 -0.07 0.04 0.04 -0.05 1.00
CPA 0.22** 0.15 0.17 * 0.03 0.22** 0.11 0.03 0.14 0.04 -0.08 0.11 0.04 0.00 -0.08 0.13 1.00
Bids Received 0.08 0.21** 0.08 -0.05 0.14* 0.03 0.04 0.19** 0.01 -0.13 0.14 -0.29*** 0.09 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 1.00
Bid Year 0.11 0.14 0.11 -0.10 0.12 0.04 -0.01 0.17* -0.02 -0.07 0.18** -0.22*** 0.15* 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.76*** 1.00
Note: This table provides the Pearson correlation matrices (coefficient) for all variables.  The variables are defined as follows:
LOG AUDIT FEES is a continuous measure of the fees a local government paid for audit services; REGULATION: is a binary measure representing a local government in Michigan1, Pennsylvania 0;
SPECIALIZATION MEASURES are as defined within the manuscript and represent an either continuous (as included above) or binary measure of a CPA firm’s level of engagement within the
marketplace; LOG POPULATION is the natural log of a government’s population; LOG FEDERAL EXPENDITURES is the natural log of a government’s federal expenditure dollars that were reported
on under OMB Circular A-133; COUNTY is 1 if the local government is a county form, else 0; CITY is 1 if the local government is a city form, else 0; URBAN GOVERNMENT is 1 if the local
government is within an urban county, else 0; INTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTION is 1 if the local government has an internal audit function, else 0; AUDIT COMMITTEE is 1 if the local government had
an audit committee, else 0;  AUDIT TENURE a categorical variable with 1 representing the shortest auditor tenure and 6 representing the longest auditor tenure; AUDITOR CHANGE is 1 if the
government switched firms for the 2010 audit, else 0; MATERIAL WEAKNESS is 1 if the local government reported a material weakness within their A-133 submission, else 0; TYPE OF AUDIT
REPORT is a categorical variable with 1 equal to an adverse opinion and 4 equal to an unqualified opinion;  CPA is 1 if the senior financial officer at the local government is a CPA, else 0; BIDS
RECEIVED is a continuous measure of the number of bids the local government received from its most recent bidding proposal; BID YEAR is 1 if 2010 is an audit year included as a component of a
multiyear fee arrangement, else 0; and bids received is a continuous measure of the number of bids the local government received from its most recent bidding proposal.
Significance is indicated as follows *p < 0.10 (two-tailed)  **p<0.05 (two-tailed)  ***p<0.01 (two-tailed)
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Table 6 OLS Results for tests of the Relation between Audit Fees, Disclosure Level and
Audit Specialization Measures
Pr
ed
.S
ig
n Measure of Specialization within the Markets
Dependent Variable
Log of Total Audit Fees
Number of
clients
Five Percent or
more of reports
filed
Ten Percent or
more of reports
filed
Regulation - -0.273 ** -0.197 * -0.219 **
(0.132) (0.121) (0.115)
Michigan Specialist Measure + 0.009 *** 0.293 *** 0.263 ***
(0.002) (0.087) (0.093)
Pennsylvania Specialist Measure ? 0.003 0.097 -0.059
0.013 (0.147) 0.174
Log Population + 0.316 *** 0.326 *** 0.339 ***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.038)
Log Federal Expenditures + 0.066 ** 0.071 ** 0.059 *
(0.040) (0.041) (0.044)
County + 0.072 -0.022 -0.045
(0.131) (0.130) (0.129)
City + 0.301 *** 0.288 *** 0.307 ***
(0.109) (0.110) (0.112)
Urban Government + 0.121 * 0.154 ** 0.158 *
(0.093) (0.094) (0.010)
Internal Audit Function + 0.156 * 0.169 ** 0.168 *
(0.103) (0.099) (0.107)
Audit Committee + 0.081 0.083 0.079
(0.085) (0.085) (0.088)
Audit Tenure + 0.048 ** 0.053 ** 0.042 *
(0.026) (0.026) (0.028)
Auditor Change - -0.072 -0.021 -0.083
(0.085) (0.088) (0.089)
Type of Audit Report Issued ? 0.649 ** 0.603 * 0.645 **
(0.316) (0.317) (0.316)
Material Weakness Issued + 0.199 *** 0.217 *** 0.239 ***
(0.065) (0.060) (0.065)
Client finance officer CPA ? 0.017 -0.010 -0.015
(0.075) (0.075) (0.076)
Bids Received on Audit - 0.003 -0.006 0.001
(0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
Bid Year - -0.001 -0.004 -0.004
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Constant 2.937 ** 3.251 ** 3.185 **
(1.258) (1.385) (1.424)
Number of Observations 122 122 122
Probability > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-Squared 0.8181 0.8141 0.8064
*, **, *** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 or 0.01 levels, respectively. Results shown are
two-tailed except where a prediction has been made. The table presents model coefficients followed by
standard errors in parenthesis. White’s statistics were utilized and all regressions have been checked for the
presence of influential points using Cook’s D statistic; three influential points were removed.
Note: variables are described in the Appendix
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My results indicate that audit fees in the regulated environment are significantly lower
(range p = .021 through p = .053) than those of the unregulated environment. This finding
suggests that regulated reporting and delivery of a consistent fixed quantity of auditing through a
concentrated market results in economies of scale where fee discounts range from 20% through
30% depending upon regression specification.29 I hypothesize that auditor specialization carries a
significant return to those firms who can differentiate their services in a regulated market and
maintain market share. My results indicate that specialist firms in Michigan earn a significant
premium for their services at p < 0.01 or on average, about 33%. Similar returns are not found in
the unregulated environment, suggesting that despite operating in an environment with higher
overall fees, specialization strategies do not necessarily result in specialist fee premiums.
Results for control variables generally follow empirical predictions. Population and
federal expenditures, two proxies for government size, are positively related to audit fees. The
coefficient for the county form of government is not significant; this result is likely because
counties are larger in overall form and have more resources to commit to financial reporting. The
city form of government did have a significant positive coefficient suggesting the smaller nature
of this government form requires additional audit effort. Urban governments are associated with
greater audit fees while the presence of an internal audit function is directly related to audit fees,
but audit committees are not significantly related to audit fees.
In terms of audit firm contracting, I find that longer auditor tenure is associated with
higher audit fees. The coefficient for an initial audit engagement is negative, but surprisingly not
29 I follow Seetharaman, Gul and Lynn (2002), Craswell et al. (1995), and Simon and Francis (1988) in calculating
the percentage discount/premium for a binary variable through the following specification ( − 1) where a denotes
parameter estimates.
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significant. I find a significant positive coefficient for the type of audit report issued indicating
greater audit fees for unqualified opinions than for qualified opinions, consistent with the notion
that qualifications are common in this reporting segment and the issuance of a qualification may
result in less audit effort.30 Material weaknesses reported under the Single Audit Act require
additional reporting, and my results indicate a significant positive relationship between material
weaknesses and audit fees.  Interestingly, my measures of competition for an audit award (Bids
Received on Audit and Bid Year) are not significant in any of the regression models.  In
untabulated results, I interact the number of bids received with my regulation and specialization
measures and similarly do not find a significant effect of bidding on engagement pricing.
To further analyze the effects of specialization in the two markets, in Table 7 I separately
analyze the top two firms in each market. In Michigan, the top two firms completed 42% of the
engagements, while 27% of engagements were completed by the top two firms in
Pennsylvania.31 In Michigan, Firm MI-A maintained the top spot as the leading firm for all but
four of the sample years; Firm MI-B maintained the second spot for the same time period but
was the top firm in the four years not held by MI-A. Pennsylvania is a bit more complex with
one firm maintaining steady market growth during 1997-2010 while other practices sporadically
grow or leave the market. In 2010 two Pennsylvania firms were tied for the top market producer
as measured by number of clients. Therefore, I assigned PA-A to the firm that audited the most
federal expenditure dollars. Interestingly, firm PA-A was never the market leader throughout
1997-2009 as measured by number of clients.
30 For example, many local governments continue to have difficulty implementing GASB 34 “Basic Financial
Statements – and Management’s Discussion and Analysis – for State and Local Governments.” If infrastructure
assets are not recorded, resulting in a qualification, less audit effort can be anticipated.
31 After the top two firms in Pennsylvania, there is a drop in market shares of subsequent firms and it becomes difficult
to identify additional specialists operating in the state.
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In Table 7, I replace the specialist variables with indicator variables representing the top
audit firms in each market. The results indicate that in the regulated state, the top specialist earns
a highly significant fee premium (p < 0.01) while specialist MI-B also earns a premium, but it is
not significant. In Pennsylvania, specialist PA-A receives significantly lower fees (p <0.10),
while specialist PA-B receives higher fees, although the coefficient is not significant.
Although I find evidence of lower fees associated with the disclosure regulated state, I
find evidence of a fee premium associated with auditor specialization.  The effect is strongest for
the auditing firm with the largest market share and who has also been the industry leader for an
extensive period of time.  This result is consistent with the notion that in a regulated setting, the
contracting incentives between auditees and auditors is impacted by the regulation, generating
value and demand for reporting expertise where that expertise appears to be priced based upon
market positioning.
In the unregulated disclosure state, specialization is associated with fee discounting.  This
finding indicates that specialization may not be valued to the same extent as it is with disclosure
regulation and therefore, a firm seeking a growth strategy within this industry must do so through
fee discounting and the market structure found in the unregulated setting makes such a
competitive strategy conducive.
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Table 7 OLS Results for Tests of the Relation between Audit Fees, Disclosure Level, and
Audit Specialization Measured at the Audit Firm Level
Measure of specialization within the markets
Dependent Variable
Log of Total Audit Fees
Firm submitting the
most reports
Top two firms
submitting reports
Regulation - -0.255 *** -0.275 ***
(0.108) (0.116)
Michigan Firm “MI – A” + 0.446 *** 0.498 ***
(0.079) (0.091)
Michigan Firm “MI – B” + 0.105
(0.095)
Pennsylvania Firm “PA – A” ? -0.403 ** -0.350 *
(0.197) (0.212)
Pennsylvania Firm “PA – B” ? 0.146
(0.178)
Log Population + 0.331 *** 0.310 ***
(0.038) (0.039)
Log Federal Expenditures + 0.080 ** 0.072 **
(0.041) (0.041)
County + 0.150 0.149
(0.131) (0.132)
City + 0.401 *** 0.383 ***
(0.097) (0.101)
Urban Government + 0.105 0.096
(0.088) (0.088)
Internal Audit Function + 0.115 0.101
(0.096) (0.097)
Audit Committee + 0.084 0.082
(0.082) (0.081)
Audit Tenure + 0.043 ** 0.044 **
(0.025) (0.025)
Auditor Change - -0.171 ** -0.154 **
(0.093) (0.090)
Type of Audit Report Issued ? 0.705 *** 0.719 ***
(0.281) (0.283)
Material Weakness Issued + 0.190 *** 0.175 ***
(0.068) (0.069)
Client finance officer CPA ? 0.039 0.043
(0.076) (0.075)
Bids Received on Audit - 0.018 0.017
(0.026) (0.025)
Bid Year - -0.010 -0.007
(0.025) (0.025)
Constant 2.851 ** 3.023 **
(1.190) (1.237)
Number of Observations 122 122
Probability > F 0.0000 0.0000
R-Squared 0.8322 0.8348
*, **, *** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 or 0.01 levels, respectively. Results are two-tailed
except where a prediction has been made. The table presents model coefficients followed by standard errors in
parenthesis. White’s statistics were utilized and all regressions have been checked for the presence of influential
points using Cook’s D statistic; three influential points were removed. Note: variables are described in the
Appendix.
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6. SENSITIVITY TESTING
6.1 Auditor Wages and Commercial Audit Fees
In my sample, competition for an audit award exists at the state level where no auditing
firm operates nationally and where most audit firms’ service governmental units solely in either
Michigan or in Pennsylvania, providing a contained marketspace.  To help rule out the potential
my results are being impacted by differences in underlying audit pricing determinants at the state
level, I examined characteristics of both auditor wages and commercial audit engagement pricing
within both states.
Differentials in auditor wages resultant from variation in the cost of living or competition
for human resources could potentially impact the results.  Using data from the U.S. Census
Bureau http://www.census.gov for occupation code 13-2011 “Accountants and Auditors” over
the time period 1997 – 2010, mean wages in Michigan and Pennsylvania were $55,604 and
$53,771, respectively.  Mean wages were marginally higher in Michigan during 1997-2004 and
marginally higher in Pennsylvania for 2005-2010.  The percentage difference in wages is
significantly smaller than the percentage difference in audit fees, suggesting that the difference
found in audit fees between the two states is not driven by differences in auditor salaries between
the two states.
As an additional test, I reviewed the audit pricing characteristics of publicly traded
entities reporting in the two states during the period 2001-2010.32 Using 2,413 firm year
observations (704 Michigan; 1,709 Pennsylvania) and after controlling for company size, I found
no state effect between commercial audit fees reported in Michigan and Pennsylvania, providing
32 2001 was the first year audit fees became available.
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further corroborating evidence that audit engagement pricing differences found in this study are
not driven by characteristics of the overall markets for auditing services within the two states.
6.2 Client Influence
A joint effect of auditor industry specialization and client bargaining power may impact
audit engagement pricing. Studies have explored this relation between audit client influence and
auditing outcomes in the markets for publicly traded entities and have found mixed evidence
between client bargaining power and auditing outcomes (Li 2010; Caterella, Francis, Lewis and
Walker 2004; Frankel, Johnson and Nelson 2002). Empirical evidence on the effects of client
importance in the municipal auditing sector is relatively limited.  Using a sample of Canadian
municipalities, Bandyopadhyay and Kao (2004) find mixed evidence pertaining to the impact of
client influence on municipal fees while also noting their study was conducted during a period of
time when the Canadian municipal auditing markets were rebalancing following the removal of
anti-competitive statutes.
I measure client importance two ways. First, based upon the relative importance of a
given municipal engagement as compared with the audit firm’s overall municipal audit portfolio .
Secondly, based upon the importance of a given municipal engagement as compared to the
state’s overall municipal audit market where client importance is measured based on the overall
federal expenditure dollars audited.33, 34 In untabulated multivariate analysis, I find no
significant effect of client influence on audit fees. As additional tests, I classify the measure
33 The ratios used in my study include all municipalities reporting under the Single Audit Act, not solely respondents
to my survey.
34 My sensitivity testing relies upon federal expenditure dollars to measure client influence as this data is empirically
available for all sampled governments and federal expenditure dollars is highly correlated with audit engagement fees.
Alternatively, I could use population or audit fees but these variables are not available for all municipalities included
in my sample.
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based upon quintiles and deciles and again, find no significant relationship between client
influence and the municipal audit fees included in my study.
6.3 Auditor Office Effects
Findings from the accounting literature demonstrate a local-level relation between auditor
specialization and audit engagement pricing.  These studies (Francis, Reichelt and Wang 2005;
Ferguson, Francis and Stokes 2003) are drawn from Big N dominated audit markets and
conclude a joint effect of national and local level (or MSA level) specialization and an audit
firm’s ability to attain pricing premiums. Despite the findings from the commercial auditing
literature, the impact of local-level auditor competition on audit engagement fees of
governmental units remains unknown, especially considering the fragmented nature of the
delivery of auditing to these entities.
Many of the specialist auditors included in my sample perform A-133 audits out of
multiple offices within their given state where one or more of those offices may have a
proportionally higher involvement in the auditing of local governments as compared with other
offices. To address the potential of specialist audit fee differentials being an artifact of a specific
firm office, in untabulated results, I segregate the specialist audit firms by office and perform
multivariate testing of engagement fees.  In my regression analysis, I find overall no significant
effect of office level specialization on my results.
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
My study explores the consequences of statutory GAAP disclosure mandates on the
structure of independent auditing markets.  Drawing a sample from two states, Michigan, which
has required that local governments follow pronouncements of the GASB and its predecessors
for at least 50 years and Pennsylvania, which has voluntary disclosure (non-GAAP), I frame my
arguments around the notion that regulatory oversight of municipal financial reporting may
impact the contracting relationships for independent auditors and auditor types.
Drawing a sample from local governments reporting under the Single Audit Act, I find
evidence suggesting the auditing markets are significantly more concentrated in the GAAP state
as compared with the markets in the non-GAAP state.  Through concentration ratios, I also find
the GAAP state contains an audit market with more extensive levels of auditor specialization and
those specialists are able to maintain their market shares over a period of time.  The non-GAAP
state has a much less structured audit market where some firms enter and leave the auditing
markets and no firm is clearly an industry leader, as measured by extensive market share.
Utilizing a change in Pennsylvanian disclosure laws, I was able to support the results of
my interstate comparison by analyzing changes in auditor concentration levels for the county
form governments, which were impacted by the revised disclosure laws compared with city form
governments, which continued to have voluntary disclosure.  My results supported the idea that
GAAP disclosure requirements, enforced through local-level regulation, impact the market
characteristics or contracting relationships for independent auditing services.
Using survey data, my study explores the policy implications of GAAP reporting statutes
on audit engagement pricing.  Building on the idea that in a market containing regulated
disclosure, the fixed levels of auditing required contribute towards an efficient independent
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auditing process and I find evidence of lower audit fees associated with the GAAP state. I
attribute the reduced auditing fees to economies of scale that may develop while auditing in a
disclosure regulated setting.
Auditor specialization has been viewed as rational economic behavior on the part of a
CPA firm, but the extent of auditor specialization varies between markets.  My study finds
evidence that the demand for auditor type is related to local level reporting regulation.
Additionally, I find that specialist auditors may price their expertise dependent upon a function
of both the demand for specialist services driven through disclosure regulation but also through
their own positioning within a given market.
I find evidence that specialization is associated with fee premiums with the GAAP
markets where I also find evidence that the market leader earns a significant fee premium for
their services.  In the unregulated state, I find evidence of fee discounting association with the
market leader, suggesting different demand for auditor type may be determined at least partially,
by GAAP reporting mandates where in the absence of disclosure regulation, specialist firms are
forced to compete based upon pricing, not the value added in their services.
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APPENDIX
Variable Description, Source and Predicted Sign
Variable Name Variable Description Source
Predicted
Sign
Total Audit Fees The sum of all 2010 audit fees paid by a municipality for
accounting services. The sum of base fees, premiums charged for
A-133 compliance (if billed separately by the accounting firm)
and any upcharges incurred on the engagement. The variable is
log transformed.
Survey
D
ep
en
de
nt
V
ar
ia
bl
e
Regulation An indicator variable measuring the level of accounting regulation
by State. The variable = 1 if the municipality is located in
Michigan (GAAP) and 0 = if the municipality is located in
Pennsylvania (NonGAAP).
Archival -
Population Population of the local government is a measure of overall size
and is representative of the government's tax base as well as
services demanded of the government. The variable is log
transformed.
Survey +
Federal
Expenditures
A complexity measure which is the sum of all federal funds
received by the municipality required to be audited in accordance
with A-133 regulations. The variable is log transformed. The
predicted sign is positive as larger federal expenditures increase
the complexity of the engagement.
Archival +
County An indicator variable = 1 if the local government takes the county
form, else 0. Due to their size, counties have greater demands
upon their reporting function and are typically more complex than
other forms of local governments. Predicted sign is positive.
Archival +
City An indicator variable = 1 if the local government takes the city
form, else 0.  Cities have different management forms than
counties, townships, boroughs, etc. Predicted sign is positive.
Archival +
Urban
Government
An indicator variable = 1 if the local government is contained in a
county classified as urban by the Office of Management and
Budget.
Archival +
Internal Audit
Function
An indicator variable = 1 if the local government has an internal
audit function, else 0. Existence of an internal audit function
signals higher desired audit/reporting quality.
Survey +
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Appendix – Continued
Audit Committee An indicator variable = 1 if the local government has an audit
committee function, else 0. Existence of an audit committee signals
higher desired audit/reporting quality.
Survey +
Audit Tenure Audit tenure is measured categorically with ranges from 1 (tenure
1 to 3 years) to 6 (tenure longer than 15 years).  The predicted
direction is positive as tenure lengthens.
Survey +
Auditor Change An indicator variable = 1 if the local government engaged a new
audit firm for reporting year 2010, else 0. The predicted direction
is negative as audit switching has been shown to be associated with
lower fees.
Survey -
Type of Audit
Report Issued
A categorical variable where 1 = Adverse opinion issued, 2 =
Disclaimer, 3 = Qualified and 4 = Unqualified opinion issued.
Given that qualifications are commonplace within the
governmental/municipal sector, no directional hypothesis is made.
Archival ?
Material Weakness
Issued
An indicator variable where 1 = Material Weakness issued on the
government's financial statement; else = 0.  Material weaknesses
result in additional reporting under the A-133 program and likely
result in increased fees.  Predicted direction is positive.
Archival +
Chief Finance
Officer is a CPA
An indicator variable = 1 if the local government employs a CPA
in the senior reporting position; else = 0. No directional prediction
is made
Survey ?
Bids Received
during last
Contracting
A continuous measure of the number of bids a local government
received from prospective service providers (CPA firms) for its
audit engagement work. The hypothesized direction is negative as
the more fee pressure exerted, the lower the audit engagement fees.
Survey -
Bid Year An indicator variable = 1 if 2010 is a year included in a multi-year
fee arrangement.
Survey -
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